Performance assessment at the Jefferson Proving Ground demonstration of systems for the detection and identification of buried unexploded ordnance

Michael P. Mulqueen; Vivian George; Anne M. Andrews; David A. Sparrow; Regina E. Dugan

doi:10.1117/12.211361

20 June 1995 Performance assessment at the Jefferson Proving Ground demonstration of systems for the detection and identification of buried unexploded ordnance

Michael P. Mulqueen, Vivian George, Anne M. Andrews, David A. Sparrow, Regina E. Dugan

Author Affiliations +

Proceedings Volume 2496, Detection Technologies for Mines and Minelike Targets; (1995) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.211361
Event: SPIE's 1995 Symposium on OE/Aerospace Sensing and Dual Use Photonics, 1995, Orlando, FL, United States

Abstract

Between August 1993 and December 1994, the Army Environmental Center conducted a congressionally mandated demonstration of systems for the detection, identification, and remediation of unexploded ordance. Two sites were prepared at Jefferson Proving Ground with emplaced inert ordance of known type in recorded locations and orientations to provide ground truth against which demonstrator performance could be evaluated. Uncertainties due to the sensor, as well as surveying errors on the part of the demonstrators, make matching the demonstrator declarations with the emplaced items on a nontrivial exercise. At the same time, an accurate evaluation of system performance requires that this matching be done in a fair and objective fashion. The matching procedure uses a 'critical distance' to determine whether a demonstrator declaration matches an emplaced item and is, therefore, counted as a detection, or does not and is counted as a false alarm. Declarations that are within the critical distance from an emplaced item are candidates for matches, and those outside the critical distance are false alarms. As expected, the number of matches is a function of the choice of critical distance. Therefore, this distance was varied and the probability of detection was determined as a dependent variable in an attempt to separate true detections from random matches of false alarms to undetected baseline items. As a result of this and other tests, we have gained confidence that relative performance rankings are not dependent on an arbitrary choice of cut- off distance and that the evaluation procedure accurately reflects demonstrator performance at the Jefferson Proving Ground demonstration. In general, detection capabilites were lower than 65 percent and most demonstrators reported multiple false alarms per ordnance item detected.

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Michael P. Mulqueen, Vivian George, Anne M. Andrews, David A. Sparrow, and Regina E. Dugan "Performance assessment at the Jefferson Proving Ground demonstration of systems for the detection and identification of buried unexploded ordnance", Proc. SPIE 2496, Detection Technologies for Mines and Minelike Targets, (20 June 1995); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.211361

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