Unmanned Ground vehicles (UGVs) are becoming prolific in the heterogeneous superset of robotic platforms. The
sensors which provide odometry, localization, perception, and vehicle diagnostics are fused to give the robotic platform
a sense of the environment it is traversing. The automotive industry CAN bus has dominated the industry due to the
fault tolerance and the message structure allowing high priority messages to reach the desired node in a real time
environment. UGVs are being researched and produced at an accelerated rate to preform arduous, repetitive, and
dangerous missions that are associated with a military action in a protracted conflict. The technology and applications of
the research will inevitably be turned into dual-use platforms to aid civil agencies in the performance of their various
operations. Our motivation is security of the holistic system; however as subsystems are outsourced in the design, the
overall security of the system may be diminished. We will focus on the CAN bus topology and the vulnerabilities
introduced in UGVs and recognizable security vulnerabilities that are inherent in the communications architecture. We
will show how data can be extracted from an add-on CAN bus that can be customized to monitor subsystems. The
information can be altered or spoofed to force the vehicle to exhibit unwanted actions or render the UGV unusable for
the designed mission. The military relies heavily on technology to maintain information dominance, and the security of
the information introduced onto the network by UGVs must be safeguarded from vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
Multiple industries, from defense to medical, are increasing their use of unmanned systems. Today, many of
these systems are rapidly designed, tested, and deployed without adequate security testing. To aid the quick turnaround,
commercially available subsystems and embedded components are often used. These components may introduce
security vulnerabilities particularly if the designers do not fully understand their functionality and limitations. There is a
need for thorough testing of unmanned systems for security vulnerabilities, which includes all subsystems. Using a
penetration testing framework would help find these vulnerabilities across different unmanned systems applications. The
framework should encompass all of the commonly implemented subsystems including, but not limited to, wireless
networks, CAN buses, passive and active sensors, positioning receivers, and data storage devices. Potential attacks and
vulnerabilities can be identified by looking at the unique characteristics of these subsystems. The framework will clearly
outline the attack vectors as they relate to each subsystem. If any vulnerabilities exist, a mitigation plan can be developed
prior to the completion of the design phase. Additionally, if the vulnerabilities are known in advance of deployment,
monitoring can be added to the design to alert operators of any attempted or successful attacks. This proposed
framework will help evaluate security risks quickly and consistently to ensure new unmanned systems are ready for
deployment. Verifying that a new unmanned system has passed a comprehensive security evaluation will ensure greater
confidence in its operational effectiveness.
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